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FIRST DAY SECTION ONE . 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Richmond, Virginia - February 21, 1978 
1. Very Wealthy, a successful businessman in Staunton, 
Virginia, employed John Barrister, a local attorney in that 
area, to represent him in his efforts to collect $5,000 which 
he claimed was owed him by Sam Sly, a resident of the City of 
Staunton, as a result of damage to his property. Wealthy 
commenced an action against Sly in the Circuit Court of Augusta 
County, where the cause of action arose, to recover damages. 
Barrister had made very little preparation for the trial of the 
case, and on the date of trial the testimony introduced by the 
defendant caused Barrister to become alarmed. After all 
evidence was in, but before the jury retired, Barrister, fearing 
the jury would return a verdict for the defendant, moved the 
Court for a nonsuit. Also, Barrister believed that he would 
have a better chance to win the case before a jury in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Staunton, the county seat of Augusta County. 
Ralph Talker, the attorney for Sly, opposed the motion for the 
nonsuit on the ground that all of the evidence had been received 
by the jury, and that it was too late to take a nonsuit. 
(a) How should the Court rule on the motion for the 
nonsuit? 
(b) Assuming the Court sustained the motion for a nonsuit, 
may a new action be commenced by Wealthy in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Staunton? 
2. On October 2, 1976, the State Highway Department of 
_Virginia began construction of a road in Botetourt County, 
Virginia, -and in doing so it took possession of and occupied 
one-tenth of an acre of land situate on the corner of a farm 
owned by Landon Gentry. One year after the road had been 
completed, Gentry consults you, advising that the State had not 
paid him for the land taken and the damages sustained by him, 
nor had the State commenced proceedings to condemn his land. 
Gentry asks you what remedy or remedies, if any, are available 
to him to compel payment for the land and the damages sustained. 
What would you advise? 
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3. Percy Plum sued Penelope Prune for specific performance 
of a contract by Penelope to furnish Percy with the entire 
crop of a rare herb, ginseng. Both parties were residents of 
Virginia and the suit was commenced in the Circuit Court of 
Augusta County, Virginia, where Penelope owned the land upon 
which the ginseng was growing. 
Penelope's 
a Federal law. 
the case may be 
for the West'ern 
lawyer advised her that the contract violates 
She therefore inquires of her lawyer whether 
removed to the United States District Court 
District of Virginia. 
How should he advise her? 
4. Bud Wiser was charged, in the Circuit Court of Greene 
County, Virginia, with driving an automobile in that County 
while under the influence of alcohol. Colorado Kookaid, a young 
attorney in that area, was appointed to represent Bud Wiser. 
At the trial the evidence presented by the Corrnnonwealth proved: 
that Bud Wiser passed a state trooper on the highway traveling 
at 100 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone; that when Bud 
Wiser was stopped the trooper smelled the odor of alcohol on 
Bud Wiser's breath; and that Bud Wiser was given a blood test 
which showed that he was not legally intoxicated. At the 
conclusion of the evidence the Court found that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict Bud Wiser of driving under the influence 
of alcohol, but that the evidence was sufficient to justify a 
conviction of reckless driving. Whereupon the attorney for the 
Commonwealth moved to amend the warrant to charge reckless 
driving and that the case be submitted to the jury on the amended 
warrant. Counsel for Bud Wiser objected to the amendment of 
the warrant. 
How should the Court rule on the motion to amend the warrant 
to charge reckless driving? 
5. On January 5, 1977 Howard Spence, a'wfdower of the 
City of Fredericksburg, entered into a written contract with 
Jack Brown to convey to the latter for $28,000 a residence 
owned by Spence and situated in that City. Pursuant to the 
terms of the contract, Brown was given immediate possession of 
the residence, gave to Spence his certified check for $14,000, 
and delivered to Spence his promissory note for $14,000 payable 
on January 5, 1978. The contract further provided that Spence 
was to deliver to Brown a deed to the residence upon Brown's 
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payment of the promissory note. Brown refused to pay the note 
on January 5, 1978 contending that the residence was worth far 
less than he had thought due to faulty construction, and urged 
Spence to accept $10,000 in satisfaction of the note. That 
Spence refused to do. · 
On January 16th, Spence brought a suit for specific 
performance of the contract of sale against Brown in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Fredericksburg. Spence's bill' alleged 
the foregoing facts, recited his readiness and willingness to 
perform the contract, recited his having tendered into the 
Clerk's Office his duly executed deed of conveyance to Brown, 
and prayed that a decree be entered requiring Brown to accept 
the deed and to pay him the $14,000 due on the promissory 
note. Brown has demurred to Spence's bill, asserting as the 
ground therefor that Spence has an adequate remedy at law. 
How should the Court rule on Brown's demurrer? 
6. Charles Rust sued Arthur Ware in the District Court 
of Henrico County to recover $4500 on a past due promissory 
note purportedly made by Ware and payable to Rust's order. 
The trial was hotly contested with Ware testifying his name 
as maker of the note had been forged, and that he was not liable 
thereon. This defense was strongly opposed by Rust who testi-
fied that Ware had executed the note in his presence at the 
time it was delivered. After hearing all the evidence, the 
District Court entered judgment for Rust on November l, 1977 .. 
Although Ware did not appeal from the judgment, he refused to 
honor it. Rust sustained a severe heart attack as a result of 
which he died testate on January 3, 1978. Shortly thereafter, 
Citizens Bank duly qualified in the Circuit Court of Henrico 
County as executor of Rust's will. 
Ware now comes to see you and recites the foregoing facts. 
He also tells you that he has learned from Tom Jones, a mutual 
friend of Rust and himself, that Jones was at the bedside of 
Rust just prior to his death, that Rust then told Jones in the 
presence of Jones' wife that he was deeply distressed by having 
obtained his judgment against Ware, and that Ware had not himself 
executed the promissory note for $4500, but that he (Rust) had 
forged Ware's signature as maker to punish Ware for having taken 
an unfair advantage of him in a business transaction several 
months before. Ware also tells you that he has made Rust's 
confession known to Citizens Bank as executor, and has asked 
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it to ignore the judgment of the District Court, but that the 
Bank has refused to do so saying it will bring a creditor's 
bill in equity to compel a sale of Ware's real estate in 
Albemarle County to satisfy the judgment. Ware then asks you 
by what legal steps, if any, he might prevent the Bank's 
subjecting the Albemarle realty to satisfaction of the judgment. 
What should your advice be? 
7. Alfred Fox loaned his automobile to his neighbor Tom 
Nolan so that Nolan could drive to the airport to meet Nolan's 
son who was returning from military service. On driving to 
the airport, Nolan collided with an automobile owned by Bob 
Patrick and then being driven by Herbert Allen, who was a sales-
man of Patrick's products. As such salesman, Allen had freedom 
in the use of the automobile and in the selection of buyers. 
His only compensation was from commissions earned on sales. At· 
the time the collision occurred, Allen was on his way to see a 
prospective buyer. The impact caused a hub cap to break loose 
from the automobile driven by Allen and cut the knee of Tom 
Scott, a pedestrian standing on the sidewalk. The collision 
took place in the City of Richmond, and was the result of the 
concurring negligence of Nolan and Allen. 
The collision has resulted in the following four actions 
at law which have been brought in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Richmond: 
(a) Fox has sued Patrick to recover $850 for damage to 
Fox's automobile; 
(b) Patrick has sued Fox to recover $600 for damage to 
Patrick's automobile; 
(c) Scott has sued Fox to recover $2400 for personal 
injuries; and 
(d) Scott has sued Patrick to recover $2400 for personal 
injuries. 
What defense, if any, does the defendant have in each of 
these actions? 
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8. Tom Smith, while hunting on the land of Herbert Neal 
after having been forbidden to so do, found a twelve guage 
shotgun which had been lost by an earlier hunter. The shotgun 
was in good condition. Not long thereafter Smith, representing 
the_ gun to be his own, sold it to Bob Prince who paid Smith in 
cash the requested price of $125. Neal has now learned of the 
foregoing facts, and, averring them in his motion for judgment, 
has brought against Prince an action in detinue to obtain 
possession of the gun. Prince has filed a demurrer to Neal's 
motion for judgment, asserting the following grounds in support 
thereof: (a) that, Smith having relinquished his right to 
possession by the sale, only the unidentified true owner now 
has a right of action against Prince to obtain possession of the 
gun; and (b) that, in any event, he obtained good title to the 
gun by acquiring it from Smith as a bona fide purchaser for 
value. 
How should the Court rule on each ground of Prince's 
demurrer? 
9. Leon Lender obtained a judgment for. $10, 000 against 
David Deadbeat in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County on 
December 1, 1977, which judgment was promptly docketed in that 
county. At that time Deadbeat owned a house in the City of 
Roanoke, and he and his wife owned as tenants by the entirety 
a farm in Roanoke County. On January 3, 1978, Deadbeat inherited 
from his father a farm in Bedford County. Shortly thereafter, 
Deadbeat conveyed the Bedford County farm to Ronald McDonald in 
full payment of a debt of $30,000 which he owed McDonald, who 
recorded the deed on February 1, 1978. Also on February 1, 1978, 
Deadbeat recorded a deed conveying his house in the City of 
Roanoke to his wife in consideration of "natural love and 
affection." After learning of Deadbeat's conveyances, on February 3, 
1978 Lender had duly authenticated abstracts of his judgment 
against Deadbeat recorded in the City of Roanoke and in Bedford 
County. 
On February 15, 1978, Lender comes to you, tells you the 
above facts and wants to know what rights, if any, he now has to 
enforce his judgment against: (a) the farm in Roanoke County, 
(b) the farm in Bedford County, and (c) the house in the City of 
Roanoke. 
How ought you to advise him as to _each? 
' } 
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10. In 1973, Bruce Bryant married Sally Strate. Two 
years later their daughter Gayle was born. In October, 1976, 
Bruce moved in with his friend, Pat Smith. Sally soon became 
tired of being exposed to public ridicule, and in December, 1977, 
she instituted a suit for divorce in the Circuit Court of King 
and Queen County. Bruce contested the suit, including Sally's 
prayer for monthly maintenance and support for herself and Gayle. 
The Chancellor decided that Bruce's activities had constituted 
continuing desertion and ground for an a vinculo divorce. 
Bruce had operated a lucrative business for a number of yea~s. 
At the time of the suit, he owned property worth approximately 
$500,000. Sally, on the other hand, was virtually penniless and 
had no earning capacity. 
After giving due consideration to the foregoing and all 
other pertinent circumstances, the Chancellor awarded Sally a 
divorce and held that Bruce should pay Sally a lump sum of 
$100,000 in lieu of periodic payments for her maintenance and 
support and that he should pay Sally $300 a month for the support 
of Gayle. The Chancellor further held that the payments for. 
Gayle should continue until she attained the age of 18 even if 
Bruce died before then. Shortly a_fter a decree to that effect 
was entered, Bruce paid Sally $100,000. A few days after making 
this lump sum payment, Bruce was shot by Pat in a quarrel and 
died immediately. Lance Gardner, a close friend of Bruce, 
qualified as the executor under Bruce's will. Sally demanded 
that Lance continue making the child support payments from the 
property in Bruce's estate. Lance has consulted you and wants 
to know: 
(a) If the Chancellor had authority to award Sally a lump 
sum payment, and 
(b) If Bruce's estate is required to continue payment for 
Gayle's support? 
How ought you to answer these questions? 
' _.,, 
